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SPEAKING OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT:   
A FIRST AMENDMENT PUSH TOWARD A STATUS-
BLIND STATUTE REGULATING “WORKPLACE 
BULLYING” 
Jessica R. Vartanian* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes discrimination in employment 
unlawful, but only based on certain suspect classes:  race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin.1  Courts have interpreted the statute to ban workplace harassment in 
this same limited fashion,2 refusing to recognize harassment claims based on sexual 
orientation or any other unspecified classification.3  Although Congress may 
regulate in this selective manner consistent with equal protection,4 workplace 
harassment differs from other forms of discrimination proscribed under Title VII in 
one very important respect—workplace harassment is often achieved through an 
array of expression traditionally protected under the First Amendment.5 
                                                                                                     
 * Judicial Clerk to Judge Richard Allen Griffin, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, 2010; B.A., University of Michigan, 2007.  I wish to 
thank those who offered comments at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law 2nd Annual 
Constitutional Law Colloquium, the Central States Law Schools Association 2011 Annual Conference, 
and the University of Toledo College of Law Faculty Roundtable, where earlier drafts of this paper were 
presented.  I would also like to extend a special thanks to Nicole B. Porter, Visiting Professor at the 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, for her valuable comments and suggestions. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 2. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 n.10 (2002) (racial 
harassment); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (sexual harassment); EEOC v. 
Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2008) (religious harassment); Velez v. City of 
Chicago, 442 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 2006) (national origin harassment). 
 3. E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (“As is evident from the 
[statutory] language, sexual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts under Title 
VII.”). 
 4. Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 954 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[D]iscrimination against 
homosexuals . . . will only constitute a violation of equal protection if it lacks a rational basis”).  But see 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-36 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s constitutional amendment 
prohibiting the enactment of legislation protecting the rights of gays and lesbians). 
 5. See Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 347, 352 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (“[A] survey of 
the kinds of events that generate hostile environment claims demonstrates that in most of them the 
hostile environment is created by an environment of insults, jokes, catcalls, comments, and other forms 
of undeniably verbal conduct.”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the 
Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 691 (1997) (“[S]ome sexual harassment 
cases rest largely on the display of pornography, the use of sexually offensive epithets, statements of 
hostility toward women in the occupation or the workplace, or other verbal or graphic expression”); 
Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 
1800-01 (1992) (“Most of the speech involved in harassment cases consist of sexual propositions; 
sexually explicit comments; demeaning . . . words used to address women . . . ; bigoted epithets; and 
pornography posted in the workplace.” (footnotes omitted)).  But see Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
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Under Title VII’s hostile environment theory, expression that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 
abusive working environment constitutes discrimination.6  Although the 
government may be justified in regulating workplace harassment because it fits the 
criteria that have warranted the suppression of speech in other contexts,7 that is not 
the end of the inquiry.  Assuming that workplace harassment is proscribable under 
the First Amendment, the following question remains:  can the government choose 
to selectively regulate only certain disfavored subjects of workplace harassment? 
The question concerns the problem of subject-matter underinclusion.  
Although not a harassment case, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of 
subject-matter underinclusion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, a case challenging the 
constitutionality of a “fighting words” ordinance.8  Despite its recognition that the 
government may constitutionally proscribe fighting words, the Court struck down 
the ordinance because it made unlawful only those fighting words based on race, 
color, creed, religion, and gender.9  By not proscribing fighting words based on 
other topics such as political affiliation, union membership, and sexual orientation, 
the ordinance was “facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted 
speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”10 The Court 
provided two exceptions to the rule against subject-matter underinclusion:  (1) 
when the underinclusion “consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of 
speech at issue is proscribable”11 and (2) when the suppression of select subjects of 
speech targets the secondary effects of the speech or is merely incidental to a 
statute directed at conduct.12  Otherwise, underinclusive regulations of proscribable 
speech must survive strict scrutiny.13    
The principal argument advanced in this Article is that Title VII’s hostile 
environment theory violates the rule against subject-matter underinclusion.  Like 
the fighting words ordinance in R.A.V., hostile environment theory proscribes 
harassing speech in the workplace based on race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin, while permitting harassing speech based on sexual orientation or any other 
unspecified classification.  In this way, hostile environment theory creates a 
hierarchy of expression, prohibiting certain subjects while tolerating others.  
Although not explicit, the unmistakable message is that the government finds 
certain forms of harassing speech (e.g., sexist speech) more offensive and 
disagreeable than others (e.g., heterosexist speech).  It is axiomatic that the 
government may not suppress the expression of ideas simply because society finds 
                                                                                                     
Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U.L. REV. 793, 804 (1991) (characterizing all 
discrimination as conduct). 
 6. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
 8. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).   Fighting words are “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942) (internal citations omitted).  
 9. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391. 
 10. Id. at 381. 
 11. Id. at 388. 
 12. Id. at 389. 
 13. Id. at 395-96. 
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the ideas offensive or disagreeable.14  Fundamentally, the First Amendment regards 
all expression in the marketplace of ideas as equally valuable.15 
Further, it is unlikely that hostile environment theory can be saved under either 
exception to the rule against subject-matter underinclusion.16  First, the subject-
matter limitation does not consist entirely of the very reason the entire class of 
speech (workplace harassment as a whole) is proscribable because it does not target 
only the most hostile harassment.  Second, hostile environment theory does not 
target the secondary effects of speech but is instead concerned with the content of 
the harassment and its primary effect on the listener.  Nor is the suppression of 
expression merely incidental to a statute aimed at conduct, as the Supreme Court 
suggested in dicta.17  Rather, silencing harassers and shielding victims from verbal 
abuse are the primary goals of hostile environment theory.  Although 
acknowledging the possibility that hostile environment theory might survive strict 
scrutiny (perhaps based on the government’s compelling interest to provide equal 
opportunity in employment to historically disadvantaged groups), the existence of 
less restrictive alternatives could make the limitation on subject matter invalid.  
Accordingly, this Article proposes the enactment of a statute regulating 
“workplace bullying,” the status-blind equivalent of workplace harassment.  A 
workplace-bullying statute would prohibit workplace abuse that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create a 
hostile environment, but it would apply irrespective of discriminatory intent.18  
Although abandoning the discrimination paradigm in favor of a status-blind statute 
would mark a significant departure in the law, the idea has gained attention and 
popularity in the United States even apart from any First Amendment concerns.  
Perhaps the most significant development is the Healthy Workplace Bill,19 
workplace-bullying legislation introduced in several state legislatures.20  Another 
sign of progress is the emergence of contractual protections against workplace 
bullying.  In the private sector, employers have voluntarily adopted workplace-
bullying policies, and the same has been achieved in the public sector through 
collective bargaining.21  In many ways, the stage is set for regulating workplace 
harassment broadly in the United States, as many European countries have done for 
                                                                                                     
 14. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 15. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2011) 
(“[T]he First Amendment regards all ideas as equal because all ideas equally reflect the autonomy of 
their speakers, and because this autonomy deserves equal respect.”).  
 16. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 17. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (suggesting in dicta that the suppression of select subclasses of 
proscribable speech under hostile environment theory is merely an incidental consequence of a statute 
directed at conduct).  At least one court has questioned this suggestion.  See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. 
Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97, & n.7 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 18. See, e.g., An Act Addressing Workplace Bullying, Mobbing, and Harassment, Without Regard 
to Protected Class Status, S.B. 699, 186th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2009), available at 
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/186/Senate/S699 [hereinafter Mass. Senate No. 699].  
 19. Id. 
 20. The Healthy Workplace Bill’s website reports that twenty-one state legislatures have considered 
the bill. The Healthy Workplace Campaign, HEALTHY WORKPLACE BILL, 
http://www.healthyworkplacebill.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). 
 21. See infra Part IV.A. 
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years.22  The problem of subject-matter underinclusion provides an additional 
reason for American lawmakers to seriously consider a status-blind statute. 
Part II introduces Title VII and outlines the evolution of hostile environment 
theory.  Part III, which is divided into three subparts, addresses the free speech 
implications for regulating workplace harassment.  Part III.A reaches the threshold 
conclusion that workplace harassment constitutes speech within the meaning of the 
First Amendment.  Part III.B concludes that the government is justified in 
regulating workplace harassment because it fits the criteria that have warranted the 
suppression of speech in other contexts.  Part III.C, however, concludes that there 
exists no justification for limiting the regulation of workplace harassment to 
specified suspect classes, and Title VII’s hostile environment theory likely fails 
constitutional scrutiny under R.A.V.  Accordingly, to align workplace harassment 
law with the First Amendment, Part IV proposes abandoning the status-based 
model in favor of a statute regulating workplace bullying.  In support of this 
proposal, this Part discusses the workplace-bullying movement and addresses 
anticipated criticisms to a status-blind statute.  Part V concludes.  
II.  TITLE VII AND HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT THEORY 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an 
individual with regard to the terms or conditions of employment based on the 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.23  The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the agency responsible for enforcing Title 
VII24 and has promulgated regulations interpreting the statute.25  Although Title VII 
does not expressly prohibit workplace harassment, courts and the EEOC have 
recognized workplace harassment as a form of employment discrimination for 
more than four decades.26  
Workplace harassment claims may be predicated on any one of Title VII’s 
protected classes.27  In terms of legal framework, however, only sexual harassment 
is bifurcated into “quid pro quo” and “hostile environment.”28  Quid pro quo 
harassment occurs when the receipt of an employment benefit or the avoidance of a 
job detriment is made contingent on an employee’s provision of sexual favors to an 
employer or supervisor.29  Hostile environment harassment, which can be based on 
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to -5 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. 1604.11 (2011) 
[hereinafter EEOC Guidelines]. 
 26. See Linda S. Greene, Sexual Harassment Law and the First Amendment, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
729, 730 (1995) (“Numerous cases have established that Title VII’s prohibitions against discrimination 
in the terms and conditions of employment include a prohibition against harassment.”); Questions and 
Answers for Small Employers on Employer Liability for Harassment by Supervisors, at Question 1, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment-facts.html (Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter EEOC Q&A] 
(explaining that harassment that is sufficiently frequent and severe to create a hostile working 
environment violates federal law).  
 27. See cases cited supra note 2.  
 28. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 25, at § 1604.11(a). 
 29. Id. 
180 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
any protected class,30 occurs when harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.31  
Only hostile environment theory is challenged here because of its impingement 
on free expression.  Although accomplished by words, the exchange in quid pro 
quo harassment does not constitute speech in the First Amendment sense, but more 
resembles an act of extortion than the expression of an idea.32  By contrast, the 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult characteristic of hostile environment harassment is 
often brimming with social and political meaning.  For example, verbal abuse 
might include comments regarding proper gender roles, criticism regarding 
affirmative action policies, or statistics purporting to signify women’s lesser 
competence compared to men in certain occupations.33  And even though a great 
deal of harassing speech is not socially or politically significant, Title VII’s hostile 
environment theory nonetheless regulates expression because the legal standard 
turns on the harassment’s content and emotive impact on the victim.34   
Workplace harassment as a legal wrong was first judicially recognized in 
1971, in a race discrimination case.35  In Rogers v. EEOC, the Fifth Circuit stated 
that “the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ . . . is an 
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating 
a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.”36  
Recognition of sexual harassment as a legal wrong emerged shortly thereafter.  In 
the earliest appellate case, Barnes v. Costle, the court held that a male supervisor 
who conditioned a female’s employment on her willingness to concede to demands 
for sexual favors discriminated based on sex.37  The court found it “too late in the 
day to contend that Title VII does not outlaw terms of employment for women 
which differ appreciably from those set for men.”38 Since Barnes, workplace 
harassment law has developed most fully with regard to sexual harassment.39  
Catharine MacKinnon’s publication, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 
                                                                                                     
 30. See EEOC Q&A, Question 2 (clarifying that its guidance applies not only to sexual harassment 
but “to all types of unlawful harassment”). 
 31. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 25, at § 1604.11(a). 
 32. See Estlund, supra note 5, at 703 (explaining that, like other performative utterances, the words 
used to accomplish quid pro quo harassment do not raise free speech concerns); Nadine Strossen, The 
Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 701, 704 (1995) (“First Amendment tensions with the concept of sexual harassment arise 
only from the hostile environment branch of harassment.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 837 (1993) (“If someone says to an employee, ‘Sleep with me or lose your job,’ 
we say that he is committing an act of harassment. The words do not cause the act. The words are the 
act.”); Volokh, supra note 5, at 1800 (explaining that quid pro quo harassment “would seemingly be as 
unprotected by the First Amendment as any other form of threat or extortion”).  
 33. See J.M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2298 
(1999). 
 34. See Jessica M. Karner, Comment, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive 
Workforce, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 637, 668 (1995). 
 35. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 36. Id. 
 37. 561 F.2d 983, 989-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977).   
 38. Id. at 989-90. 
 39. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Harris v. Forklift 
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).  
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provided a major catalyst in courts’ acceptance of sexual harassment as a legal 
harm.40  MacKinnon relied on the experiences of women to support her position 
that sexual coercion in the workplace causes women injury for which the law 
should provide a remedy, and she crafted a legal framework to address the harm in 
a way that courts could accept and apply.41  It was MacKinnon who initially 
divided the sexual harassment experienced by women into the two forms judicially 
recognized today.42  She defined the quid pro quo variety as an exchange in which 
a woman must comply sexually or forfeit a tangible employment benefit43 and 
defined the condition of work variety, now known as hostile environment 
harassment, as pervasive verbal or physical behavior directed toward a woman that 
makes continued presence in the workplace intolerable.44  
The Supreme Court first recognized the maintenance of a hostile environment 
as a form of sex discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, decided in 
1986.45  In Meritor, the plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly demanded sexual favors 
from the plaintiff, which she returned for fear of losing her job.46  The Court held 
that a claim predicated on a sexually hostile environment is actionable where the 
harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”47 
Seven years later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that 
repeated and unwelcomed sexual innuendo and degrading comments expressing 
negativity toward women in the workplace forced her to quit her job.48  The 
Supreme Court further delineated the standard announced in Meritor by inserting a 
reasonable person component and clarifying that a plaintiff need not prove 
psychological injury.49  Under Harris, conduct that is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to create a hostile or abusive work environment from both an objective 
and subjective standpoint is actionable under Title VII even absent evidence that 
the plaintiff suffered psychological injury.50  Although the Court at times referred 
to such harassment as achieved through “conduct,”51 it indicated that severe or 
pervasive intimidation, ridicule, and insult could alone create a hostile 
                                                                                                     
 40. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). See also 
Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 9 
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).  
 41.  MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 32. See also SIEGEL, supra note 37, at 9 (explaining that 
Catharine MacKinnon played a crucial role in persuading the judiciary to accept sexual harassment as 
discrimination by presenting “the injuries inflicted on women by sexual coercion at work . . . in terms 
that could be assimilated to a body of law adopted to regulate practices of racial segregation in the 
workplace”). 
 42. MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 32-47. 
 43. Id. at 32. 
 44. Id. at 40. 
 45. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).   
 46. Id. at 60. 
 47. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)) (alteration in 
original). 
 48. 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).   
 49. Id. at 21-22. 
 50. Id. at 22. 
 51. Id. at 21-22. 
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environment, thus contemplating a cause of action based on purely verbal abuse.52   
Of course, for any sex discrimination claim to be actionable, the discrimination 
must be because of sex.  Claims of same-sex sexual harassment raised new 
questions because of a potential that the victim’s sexual orientation motivated the 
harassment.  In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court 
held that nothing in Title VII bars a sex discrimination claim simply because the 
plaintiff and the defendant are of the same sex.53  For example, a general hostility 
toward women in the workplace may motivate a woman to harass another woman 
through use of sex-specific and derogatory terms, and this may constitute sex 
discrimination.54  Still, a plaintiff must prove that the harassment was because of 
sex, as opposed to some other classification, such as sexual orientation.55   
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins also brought about significant change to the law 
of sex discrimination.56  Price Waterhouse tells the story of Ann Hopkins, an 
ambitious career woman seeking partnership in a large accounting firm.57  
Although Hopkins’ credentials, dedication, and performance surpassed that of her 
male colleagues, the firm denied her partnership because she appeared too 
aggressive and assertive and lacked feminine social graces.58  In ruling in Hopkins’ 
favor, the Court stated that, “we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype 
associated with their group.”59  According to the Court, “[a]n employer who objects 
to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in 
an intolerable and impermissible catch 22:  out of a job if they behave aggressively 
and out of a job if they do not.”60 
Under Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against an employee 
because of his or her gender non-conforming behavior may violate Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination.61  This is true even though the terms “sex” and 
                                                                                                     
 52. Id. at 21 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65, 67).  The parties in Harris included 
arguments in their briefs discussing the potential free speech implications for Title VII’s hostile 
environment theory. Brief of Respondent at 41-44, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 
92-1168), 1993 WL 302223, at *31-33; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 632335, at *10.  Yet the Court did not so much as mention 
the First Amendment in rendering its decision.  There are many reasons that might lead a court to 
remain silent on an issue, and one can only speculate about the Court’s motive for remaining silent in 
Harris.  As with all judicial decisions, Harris should be read to mean only that which it explicitly 
provides.  See Kingsley R. Browne, The Silenced Workplace:  Employer Censorship Under Title VII, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 399, 402-03 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel 
eds., 2004).  Because the Supreme Court has never directly confronted the free speech implications for 
regulating workplace harassment, this Article treats the issue as open and deserving of discussion.  But 
see SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 356-60 (suggesting that the Court dismissed the parties’ free speech 
arguments as too trivial to warrant discussion). 
 53. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 54. Id. at 80. 
 55. Id. at 81. 
 56. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 57. Id. at 232-33. 
 58. Id. at 234-37. 
 59. Id. at 251. 
 60. Id.  
 61. See id. (“Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender 
played a part in a particular employment decision. The plaintiff must show that the employer actually 
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“gender” are not synonymous.  “Sex” refers to the anatomical distinction between 
men and women, whereas “gender” is the social meaning given to sex—in other 
words, what society understands as masculine and feminine.62  Price Waterhouse 
thus blurred the line between sex and gender, at least as far as the law is 
concerned.63  Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s guidance, 
concluding that it is unlawful under Title VII to harass individuals based on their 
failure to conform to stereotypical notions about how men and women should 
behave.64  
Courts often uphold claims of sex discrimination against transgender 
individuals, invoking the sex stereotyping analysis from Price Waterhouse.  Before 
Price Waterhouse, courts rejected Title VII claims brought by transgender 
individuals, reasoning that Congress did not intend the term “sex” to include 
transsexualism.65  Following Price Waterhouse, however, courts increasingly treat 
transsexualism like any other instance of gender nonconformity.66  
Despite its success in other areas, sex stereotyping has not provided an avenue 
of relief for harassment based on sexual orientation.67  This creates an odd 
juxtaposition in the law because an individual’s status as a homosexual would seem 
to constitute quintessential gender nonconforming behavior under Price 
                                                                                                     
relied on her gender in making its decision. In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly 
be evidence that gender played a part.”). 
 62. See generally Franscisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the 
Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 3, 20-23 (1995); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 24-25 (1992) 
(describing “gender” as a term “borrowed from grammar to designate the sexes as viewed as social 
rather than biological classes”).  
 63. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the Court in Price 
Waterhouse interpreted “sex” under Title VII to encompass not only sex in the biological sense, but also 
gender in the societal sense).   
 64. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New 
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[J]ust as a woman can ground an 
action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations 
of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because 
he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity.”); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581 
(7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (“A man who is 
harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair long, or because in some other respect 
he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear 
and behave, is harassed ‘because of his sex.’”);  see also, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
260 F.3d 257, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that harassment may constitute sex discrimination where 
the “harasser’s conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not conform to the stereotypes of 
his or her gender”). 
 65. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim 
because she “was not discriminated against as a female” and because “Title VII is not so expansive in 
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Waterhouse.  In this way, maintaining the line between sex discrimination and 
sexual orientation discrimination has become less sustainable.  As a practical 
matter, the concepts of sex, sexual orientation, and gender are intertwined, with one 
concept often informing the others.  
For example, as Sylvia Law has argued, heterosexism preserves traditional 
notions of masculinity and femininity, thereby informing the social meaning of 
gender.68  By protecting heterosexuality and censuring homosexuality, the law 
preserves gender role expectations.69  Sylvia Law explains the societal message as 
follows:  “Real men are and should be sexually attracted to women, and real 
women invite and enjoy that attraction.”70  This is sex stereotyping at its core.  
Nonetheless, no court has recognized a claim of sexual orientation harassment 
under Title VII.  Regrettably, given the statutory text, such reluctance is 
understandable.  It is difficult to dispute the difference between sex and sexual 
orientation or that Congress viewed the concepts as distinct.  The statute 
unambiguously prohibits discrimination only based on certain subjects.  Whether 
the statute’s limitation is consistent with the First Amendment, however, is a 
separate matter.  
III.  FREE SPEECH IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATING WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 
Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”71  Courts have never interpreted this language in a pure textual 
sense.  Rather, speech is not limited to the spoken or written word,72 and the 
government may abridge the freedom of speech in certain circumstances.73   This 
Part addresses whether workplace harassment constitutes “speech” under the First 
Amendment and, if so, whether the government can constitutionally regulate it.        
A.  Does Workplace Harassment Constitute “Speech”? 
The strictures of the First Amendment apply only to the government’s 
regulation of speech.  Many courts and scholars take the position that Title VII’s 
hostile environment theory regulates conduct, a position that would end the First 
Amendment argument presented in this Article before it begins,74 but such a 
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position is unsustainable for several reasons.   
First, workplace harassment law presents a clear case in which the government 
seeks to restrict speech because of the message it conveys and the effect of that 
message on the listener.75  This is evident from the central inquiry in any hostile 
environment claim:  whether the harassment is severe or pervasive enough to alter 
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create a hostile or abusive 
environment.  Simply, the question cannot be answered without considering the 
expressive content of the harassment and its emotive impact on the victim.   
The major opponent to the conclusion that workplace harassment law regulates 
speech is Catharine MacKinnon, who characterizes harassment and other 
expression that is harmful to women as conduct.76  MacKinnon and Andrea 
Dworkin worked to establish a law that made pornography a civil rights violation, 
but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down the 
Indianapolis version of their law in American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut.77  
MacKinnon takes exception to the ruling, claiming that a law against pornography 
is not content-based.78  She instead characterizes the law as harm-based, a legal 
scheme aimed at an act or practice that subordinates women,79 and asserts that a 
law banning pornography “comes nowhere near anybody’s speech rights.”80  
In a thought-provoking opinion, Judge Frank Easterbrook considered the 
position advanced in favor of a law banning pornography:   
[P]ornography affects thoughts.  Men who see women depicted as subordinate are 
more likely to treat them so.  Pornography is an aspect of dominance.  It does not 
persuade people so much as change them.  It works by socializing, by establishing 
the expected and the permissible.  In this view pornography is not an idea; 
pornography is the injury.81  
He willingly accepted the truth to this argument, that by perpetuating the 
subordination of women, pornography harms women in their pursuit of equality 
and other rights.82  Yet, according to Judge Easterbrook, this no more changes the 
communicative quality of pornography than does the invidiousness of racial bigotry 
and anti-Semitism and the harm those communications cause.83  Rather, “this 
simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech.  All of these unhappy 
effects depend on mental intermediation.  Pornography affects how people see the 
world, their fellows, and social relations.  If pornography is what pornography 
does, so is other speech.”84 
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Judge Easterbrook properly analyzed the First Amendment issue.  The point 
missed by MacKinnon and others who view workplace harassment law as harm-
based is that all regulations of speech are harm-based in some sense.  What would 
prompt lawmakers to restrict speech not perceived as at least minimally harmful? 
Laws prohibiting obscenity, fighting words, and defamation do so precisely to 
protect against the deleterious effects associated with those communications.  Yet 
their status as speech has never been challenged, and courts have never so much as 
considered labeling these categories of speech as conduct.  To borrow Judge 
Easterbrook’s words, if workplace harassment is what it does, then so is other 
speech such as fighting words and hate speech, which also advance aspects of 
dominance and hinder equality.  With regard to pornography in particular, one 
scholar points out the perhaps regrettable truth that “if there is anything that 
prompts a reflexive reaction that the First Amendment is involved, it is Playboy.”85 
Pornography and other vehicles of harassment should be taken at face value for 
what they are, however disagreeable.  
In addition, there is a tendency when seeking to justify restricting certain kinds 
of speech to label the speech as conduct to avoid engaging in a serious free speech 
analysis that might, inconveniently, raise constitutional concern.86  For example, in 
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,87 a case in which the plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant unlawfully maintained a sexually hostile work environment,88 the 
defendant argued that the First Amendment prevented the court from ordering 
injunctive relief.89  The court rejected the defendant’s argument because “pictures 
and verbal harassment . . . act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile 
work environment.”90 Although the court correctly noted that the government may 
regulate “expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their 
communicative impact,”91 the court failed to identify a harm apart from 
harassment’s communicative impact on victims with which hostile environment 
theory is concerned.  It also failed to otherwise support the characterization of 
harassing speech as conduct.  This dangerous tendency should be resisted.92  A law 
that restricts speech because of the message it conveys and the effect of that 
message upon the listener is a speech restriction.93  Speech restrictions must satisfy 
the First Amendment and may not be summarily dismissed by mere labels.94  
Finally, the fact that workplace harassment occurs in the workplace does not 
change its character as speech.  It does not follow that the taunts, jokes, ridicule, 
and displays of pornography that are undeniably speech outside the workplace 
somehow change in form when expressed in the workplace and used to support a 
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hostile environment claim.  As explained below, the setting in which speech takes 
place may offer a greater justification for governmental regulation, but the 
character of speech as such remains the same.95  
B.  Can the Government Regulate Workplace Harassment?  
Having concluded that workplace harassment is properly characterized as 
expression under the First Amendment, the next question is whether the 
government may constitutionally regulate it.  Central to courts’ approach to the 
First Amendment is the distinction between content-based regulations—those in 
which the government restricts expression based on its agreement or disagreement 
with the ideas or views conveyed—and content-neutral regulations—those in 
which the government restricts expression without regard to the ideas or views 
conveyed.96  Title VII’s hostile environment theory is a content-based regulation of 
speech because whether expression in the workplace constitutes actionable 
harassment depends on its communicative content—whether the expression is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment 
and create a hostile or abusive environment.  Content-based regulations are 
“presumptively invalid”97 and subject to “the most exacting scrutiny.”98  
Nevertheless, there are certain circumstances under which courts have held that the 
government can regulate speech based on its content.  This subpart discusses three 
such circumstances.  
1.  Captive Audiences and the Confines of the Employment Relationship 
Under the captive audience doctrine, the government has the power to protect 
listeners from unwelcomed speech, even based on content, where their privacy is 
being invaded in an intolerable way.99  That is, if an individual is being unfairly 
coerced into listening to speech and cannot reasonably avoid the speech, then the 
government can intervene to prevent the speech.  The doctrine has typically applied 
to protect the privacy of the home and has rarely been extended to other contexts.  
For instance, the Court used the doctrine to uphold a statute giving homeowners the 
right to restrict the delivery of offensive mail100 and an ordinance prohibiting 
residential picketing of individual homes.101  But the Court refused to extend the 
                                                                                                     
 95. See Balkin, supra note 33, at 2307 (explaining that “[o]ften speech that would be protected in 
the public square becomes unprotected when it occurs in special social situations involving special 
social roles”). 
 96. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994).  Compare Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988) (ordinance prohibiting the display of signs near a foreign embassy if the 
signs tend to bring that foreign government into public disrepute was content-based), with City Council 
of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs 
on public property was content-neutral because it restricted speech without regard to subject matter or 
viewpoint).  
 97. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 98. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642. 
 99. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
 100. Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970). 
 101. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988). 
188 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
doctrine to a courtroom in Cohen v. California102 or to the memorial service of a 
soldier killed in the line of duty in Snyder v. Phelps.103  
The one instance in which the Court has extended the doctrine outside the 
home was to uphold a ban of political advertising on public buses in Lehman v. 
City of Shaker Heights.104  The Court stated that “the nature of the forum and the 
conflicting interests involved have remained important in determining the degree of 
protection afforded by the [First] Amendment to the speech in question.”105 The 
Court reasoned that the city had an interest in making reasonable choices regarding 
acceptable advertising on its buses “to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance 
of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience.”106 This suggests 
that the Court might not view the captive audience doctrine so narrowly as to 
foreclose its extension to forums other than the home, where interests other than 
privacy are in play. 
Justice Douglas made an even more forceful argument regarding captivity in 
his concurrence:   
While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to 
listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of 
declining to receive it.  In my view the right of the commuters to be free from 
forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles 
of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this 
captive audience.107 
Justice Douglas also noted that public transportation is “a practical necessity for 
millions in our urban centers.”108 
Justice Douglas’s interpretation of the captive audience doctrine is persuasive.  
For many, use of public transportation is no more a choice than is the decision to 
eat, sleep, and earn a living.  Thus, although one has a greater claim to privacy in 
the home than when riding a public bus, other more urgent and fundamental 
interests are greater when on a bus than when in the home.  These interests, too, are 
worthy of consideration in determining whether individuals should be deemed 
captives to offensive speech.  In this way, Lehman offers a starting point in favor of 
extending the captive audience doctrine to contexts in which interests other than 
privacy are implicated.109  In fact, at least one federal district court has applied the 
doctrine to uphold the regulation of workplace harassment.  In Robinson v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida held that employees unwillingly subjected to racist and sexist speech 
creating a hostile environment were captives to the speech because of the coercion 
inherent in the employment relationship.110   
J.M. Balkin argues persuasively that the captive audience doctrine justifies 
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regulating workplace harassment because victims must endure the unwelcomed 
speech to preserve their livelihood and social status; victims of workplace 
harassment are captives in every real sense of the word.111  While acknowledging 
that the doctrine typically applies to the home, Balkin finds the doctrine better 
suited for the workplace.112  According to Balkin, the same speech protected 
outside the workplace becomes unprotected within the workplace because of the 
economic and social dependence of employees on continued employment.113  
Because of our economic and social dependence on work, the consequences of 
avoiding unwanted speech in the workplace are for most people far greater than the 
consequences of avoiding unwanted speech in the home.  
Opposing Balkin, Eugene Volokh argues that extending the captive audience 
doctrine to the workplace would require the absurd conclusion that individuals are 
somehow more captive to offensive speech at work than when in a courthouse, as 
in Cohen, or at a school board meeting, as in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey.114  But such 
a conclusion is not absurd.  What Volokh overlooks is that the workplace is 
different from the courtroom or school board meeting because of the economic and 
social dependence inherent in the employment relationship.  Continued presence is 
more of a choice in a courthouse or school board meeting than in the workplace 
because one’s livelihood and social status depend on maintaining gainful 
employment. 
Volokh also finds it implausible that the Court would have reached different 
outcomes had it been employees, as opposed to mere attendees, who were at the 
courtroom and school board meeting and unable to avoid the offensive speech 
because their jobs required them to remain.115  Yet the right of employees to be free 
from offensive speech was not at issue in Cohen or Rosenfeld,116 and the Court has 
never confronted the question whether the captive audience doctrine might apply 
with greater force in the employment context than in public places.  Furthermore, 
the speech at issue in Cohen and Rosenfeld (a few offensive epithets) would in all 
likelihood not have established a hostile environment under Title VII.  Title VII 
does not prevent all commentary with the effect to offend.117    
Although the Court’s articulation of the captive audience doctrine has been 
more concerned with privacy interests than with actual captivity,118 perhaps this is 
the wrong focus.  If we are truly concerned with captivity, as the doctrine would 
suggest, then the doctrine should extend to the workplace because of employees’ 
social and economic dependence on work.  
Further, the Court has already recognized the confines of the employment 
relationship as a justification for restricting workplace speech.  In NLRB v. Gissel 
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Packing Co., the Court considered the speech rights of a private employer in the 
context of labor relations.119  The Court explained that the speech rights of 
employers must account for the economic dependence of employees on continued 
employment.120  Because of this dependency, employees’ ability to listen 
objectively and act independently in a union election is far more constrained than 
citizens’ ability to vote freely in a government election or on the enactment of 
legislation.121  In other words, the employment relationship compromises employee 
free choice.  Therefore, the Court held that an employer’s right to speak is 
limited—an employer cannot make “threat[s] of reprisal . . . or promise[s] of 
benefit” in connection with a union election.122   
How does this affect workplace harassment?  Gissel is relevant because hostile 
environments are employer-maintained.  The ability of employees to act 
independently in response to workplace harassment and challenge its continuation 
is compromised because employees depend on their employer, who has maintained 
the hostile environment, for continued employment.  Without the free choice to 
challenge the hostile environment, a victim of workplace harassment faces a similar 
predicament as an employee whose employer has made threats or promises in 
connection with a union election.  Thus, while acknowledging the narrow 
circumstances under which Gissel was decided (speech rights of a private employer 
in the context of a union election), the decision nonetheless lends support to the 
government’s ability to regulate workplace harassment.  
2.  Existing Limitations on Employee Speech 
The Court has also decided cases regarding the speech rights of public 
employees.  Public employees were once thought to surrender their constitutional 
rights by reason of government employment.123  That position has since been 
rejected.124  In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court held that a school district 
could not fire a teacher for sending a letter to a local newspaper critical of the 
school board’s funding policies.125  “The problem in any case is to arrive at a 
balance between the interests of the [government employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”126  According to the Court, sending the letter did not interfere with the 
teacher’s daily work and, therefore, did not negatively affect efficiency in the 
education of students.127  Because questions on school funding present matters of 
public concern for which teachers are likely to have informed opinions, allowing 
teachers to contribute to public debate without fear of retaliatory dismissal furthers 
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informed decision-making by the electorate.128   
The Court revisited the issue of public employee speech in Connick v. 
Myers.129  There, the Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent the 
dismissal of an assistant district attorney who prepared and distributed a 
questionnaire soliciting views of her coworkers about various office matters.130  
Because the “questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern” only 
minimally and primarily reflected an employee’s displeasure with internal office 
policy, the Court upheld the dismissal.131   
The Pickering-Connick balancing test continues to govern the speech rights of 
public employees.  Only speech on matters of public concern that does not unduly 
interfere with business efficiency receives First Amendment protection.132  With 
regard to workplace harassment, although some harassing speech creating a hostile 
environment could be said to touch on matters of public concern,133 harassers are 
often motivated by purely personal interests unrelated to any political, social, or 
other communal concern.  Moreover, harassing speech creating a hostile 
environment, by definition, interferes with business efficiency.  To be actionable, 
the harassment must be so severe or pervasive that the employee literally cannot 
tolerate working in the environment.134  Because very little workplace harassment 
touches on matters of public concern and all harassment creating a hostile 
environment disrupts business efficiency, a workplace harassment statute could be 
upheld under the Pickering-Connick balancing test or some variation thereof.   
One concern with relying on the Pickering-Connick balancing test is that it 
developed in the context of public employment, and Title VII applies to both the 
public and private sectors.  Nonetheless, this should not preclude the use of the test 
to assess the constitutionality of a workplace harassment statute because public 
employees have more speech rights than private employees.  If speech creating a 
hostile environment in the public sector can be infringed under the Pickering-
Connick balancing test, then there would seem no question that speech creating a 
hostile environment in the private sector can be infringed.   
A second concern stems from the fact that the Pickering-Connick balancing 
test was formulated to address the government’s ability as an employer to restrict 
expression, whereas the constitutionality of Title VII’s hostile environment theory 
concerns the government’s ability as a regulator to restrict expression.  
Admittedly, the government’s interest as an employer in restricting employee 
speech is greater than its interest as a regulator in restricting the speech of citizens 
in general.135  But this is not to say that the government’s interest as a regulator is 
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never great enough to justify a restriction on workplace speech.  The government, 
even as a regulator, has a strong interest in ensuring employees a workplace free 
from hostility and abuse.  Thus, the Pickering-Connick balancing test may provide 
a viable means to uphold a workplace harassment statute. 
3.  Categorical Exceptions 
Our society permits content-based regulations of certain categories of speech 
deemed as having such slight social value that society’s interest in order and 
morality outweigh any benefit that may be derived from the speech.136  Existing 
categories of proscribable speech that may be relevant to workplace harassment 
law include fighting words, obscenity, and defamation.137  In addition, the 
government has some latitude to regulate speech that is sexually explicit though not 
obscene if the regulation restricts only the time, place, and manner of the speech 
and is concerned, not with the message conveyed by the speech, but with the 
secondary effects associated with the speech.138  As this subpart explains, 
workplace harassment law cannot be justified under any existing categorical 
exception.  Nonetheless, an examination of the Court’s methodology for 
announcing new classes of proscribable speech could support creating a categorical 
exception for workplace harassment.   
a.  Existing Categories of Proscribable Speech Do Not Justify Regulating 
Workplace Harassment 
The Supreme Court announced the “fighting words” doctrine in Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, holding that the government may proscribe words “which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”139 
The Court later refined the test, limiting fighting words to those utterances directed 
at an individual and likely to provoke a violent reaction.140  Thus, the doctrine does 
not permit the government to suppress utterances that are not directed at a 
particular individual or that merely cause offense or discomfort among unwilling 
listeners.141   
Hostile environment theory is too broad to be justified under the fighting 
words doctrine.  First, harassment need not be directed at an individual to be 
actionable and the plaintiff does not need to prove that the harasser intended to 
discriminate.142  The question is whether the harassment altered the conditions of 
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the plaintiff’s employment, the focus being the working environment from the 
plaintiff’s perspective.143  Accordingly, undirected negative sentiments regarding 
women’s presence in the workplace144 and pornographic pictures displayed in 
community areas for all to view145 can support a hostile environment claim, even 
where the harasser had no intent to discriminate against a particular victim.  
Second, harassment need not be likely to provoke a violent reaction to be 
actionable.146  Sexual propositions, pornographic material, and disparaging 
comments toward women, while offensive (even intolerably so), are not typically 
thought to provoke violence, though they might cause a victim to quit or file a 
complaint.   
“Obscenity” is another category of speech deemed beyond the purview of the 
First Amendment.147  To be considered obscene, material must appeal to the 
prurient interest in sex in a patently offensive manner and lack serious redeeming 
“literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”148  Depictions of sexual acts and 
masturbation meet the patently offensive requirement, but mere nudity, without 
more, does not.149  Workplace harassment law cannot be justified on the basis of 
obscenity alone because only the most graphic displays of pornography qualify as 
obscene.  Not only does the vast majority of what courts deem sexually harassing 
speech fall outside this narrow category, but also, harassing speech supporting a 
hostile environment claim based on sex need not be sexual at all, so long as the 
speech can be said to discriminate based on sex.  Many courts have recognized this 
principle,150 and courts that continue to require harassment based on sex to be 
                                                                                                     
Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893, 902-03 (7th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that a Title VII plaintiff need not 
be an intended target of harassment if the plaintiff is within the protected class that the harassment 
targets more generally); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that 
racially derogatory comments made outside a plaintiff’s presence can be relevant in a hostile 
environment claim). 
 143. See Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 1999); King v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537-38 (7th Cir. 1990); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 
1187 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 144. See Jackson, 191 F.3d at 661 (“[I]n the sexual harassment context, this Court has deemed 
probative remarks that demeaned women generally while not demeaning any one woman in 
particular.”); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] plaintiff may 
show that, while she was not personally subjected to harassing conduct, her working conditions were 
nevertheless altered as a result of witnessing a defendant’s hostility towards other women at the 
workplace.”). 
 145. See Hoyle v. Freightliner, L.L.C., 650 F.3d 321, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2011) (“A juror could 
reasonably find that sexualizing the work environment by placing photos of nude women or women in 
sexually provocative dress and poses in common areas is detrimental to female employees and satisfies 
the ‘because of sex’ requirement.”); Harley v. McCoach, 928 F. Supp. 533, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“An 
objectively hostile work environment can arise from . . . the pervasive display of pornography in 
common areas in the workplace.”). 
 146. See Karner, supra note 34, at 664. 
 147. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“[O]bscenity is not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech or press.”). 
 148. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 149. Id. at 25-26. 
 150. E.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 
833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
194 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
sexual in nature are misguided.151  Finally, only perhaps in a very unusual case 
could obscene material support a hostile environment based on race, religion, or 
national origin.  Accordingly, hostile environment theory is overbroad as a 
regulation of obscenity. 
The government may also constitutionally proscribe defamation.152  Although 
the Court once upheld a group libel statute in Beauharnais v. Illinois,153 such a 
statute would probably not pass constitutional muster today.154  This is because 
modern defamation law requires a showing that a reasonable person would 
perceive the alleged defamatory statements to be directed at or referring to the 
plaintiff.155  Further, statements of opinion are not actionable unless the opinion 
could be reasonably interpreted as a statement of fact.156  This second limitation 
protects inherently unverifiable assertions from regulation.157   
Defamation law cannot save workplace harassment law.  As explained above, 
there is no requirement under Title VII that a harasser have directed his or her 
speech at a particular plaintiff.  Furthermore, loose generalizations (e.g., “women 
make poor police officers”) are commonplace in harassment claims, and only some 
harassing statements could be viewed as assertions of fact.  For example, although 
the assertion that Suzie employee has slept with several men in the office could, 
under the proper circumstances, be reasonably interpreted as a statement of fact, the 
assertion that Suzie employee sleeps with every man she meets could not.  In short, 
defamation law justifies only a fraction of the speech that constitutes actionable 
workplace harassment. 
Finally, the Court has long held that the First Amendment allows “time, place, 
and manner” regulations of speech.  To qualify as a “time, place, and manner” 
regulation, the regulation “must not be based on the content of the message, must 
be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave 
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open ample alternatives for communication.”158  The main reason that workplace 
harassment law cannot be justified as a “time, place, and manner” regulation is 
because it is not content-neutral.159  Whether harassment is severe or pervasive 
enough to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create a hostile 
environment turns entirely upon its content; simply, one cannot determine whether 
harassment amounts to a hostile environment without considering its 
communicative content.160   
Nevertheless, courts have provided the government some latitude in regulating 
the location of sexually explicit speech.  Although not obscene, and thus protected 
by the First Amendment, sexually explicit speech is deemed low value, falling only 
“within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.”161  To uphold restrictions on 
sexually explicit speech, the Court has relied on the “time, place, and manner” 
doctrine in conjunction with the “secondary effects” doctrine.  For instance, in 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, the Court considered whether a zoning 
ordinance differentiating between motion picture theaters that exhibited sexually 
explicit films from those that did not constituted an impermissible content-based 
restriction of speech.162  Whether a film was “adult” was determined based on its 
content; however, because the ordinance merely limited the place in which adult 
films could be exhibited, the Court held that the interest in preserving 
neighborhood character justified the classification.163  The Court in City of Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. engaged in a similar analysis to uphold a zoning 
ordinance preventing adult theaters from operating 1,000 feet from designated 
places such as churches, parks, or schools.164  Like the ordinance in Young, the 
ordinance in Renton limited only the location of adult theaters.165  The Court 
acknowledged that the ordinance did not fall neatly within the “time, place, and 
manner” doctrine because it treated theaters that exhibited adult films differently 
than those that did not.166  Nonetheless, it upheld the ordinance because it was 
aimed at the secondary effects on the quality of urban life caused by adult theaters, 
rather than the suppression of expression.167 
Workplace harassment law does not fall within this line of cases.  Title VII is 
far more sweeping in application than the zoning ordinances in Young and Renton, 
extending to all employers other than the federal government having fifteen or 
more employees.168  Title VII also targets far more than sexually explicit speech.  
Sexist speech need not be sexual in nature, and Title VII targets harassment based 
on race, religion, and national origin as well.  Moreover, because hostile 
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environment theory targets the primary effects of harassing speech, it cannot be 
justified under the secondary effects doctrine.169  The government’s interest in 
regulating harassment at work—providing employees a work environment free 
from hostility and abuse based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin—
although important, cannot be fairly characterized as aimed at secondary effects or 
unrelated to the suppression of expression because the law’s application turns 
entirely upon the ideas conveyed and their primary effect upon the listener.170   
Title VII’s hostile environment theory reflects a desire to prevent 
psychological damage to victims of workplace harassment.171  In Boos v. Barry, the 
Court explained:   
Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience present a 
different situation [than in Renton].  Listeners’ reactions to speech are not the type 
of “secondary effects” we referred to in Renton.  To take an example factually 
close to Renton, if the ordinance there was justified by the city’s desire to prevent 
the psychological damage it felt was associated with viewing adult movies, then 
analysis of the measure as a content-based statute would have been appropriate.  
The hypothetical regulation targets the direct impact of a particular category of 
speech, not a secondary feature that happens to be associated with that type of 
speech.172 
Employing this reasoning, a legal scheme targeting the psychological damage 
experienced by employees subjected to ridicule and insult amounting to a hostile 
work environment is one aimed at the primary effects of speech.   
The evidence that courts consider in harassment cases illustrates the law’s 
concern for primary effects.  In Robinson, for example, the court noted that 
harassment causes side effects including distraction from tasks, dread of work, 
inability to work, anger, fear of physical safety, anxiety, depression, guilt, 
humiliation, and embarrassment.173  The court stated that “[s]exual harassment has 
a cumulative, eroding effect on the victim’s well-being.”174 It is no wonder that 
courts find these types of psychological damage relevant in hostile environment 
claims.  Whether harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the 
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment’” depends in large part on the emotive impact of the harassment on 
the victim.175  Yet psychological damage and other negative reactions of unwilling 
listeners are primary effects of speech.176  It is for all of these reasons that 
workplace harassment law cannot be justified as a “time, place, and manner” 
regulation aimed at secondary effects.  
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b.  Workplace Harassment as a New Categorical Exception 
Although workplace harassment law cannot be justified under any existing 
category of proscribable speech, perhaps the Court should declare a new 
categorical exception for workplace harassment.  At the outset, it must be 
acknowledged that the Court is wary of announcing new categorical exceptions for 
fear of diluting the First Amendment,177 and no court has embraced a categorical 
exception for workplace harassment.178  Nonetheless, the Court’s methodology 
could support creating a categorical exception for workplace harassment. 
Two considerations have driven the Court’s analysis in this area.  The Court 
has first considered whether the speech at issue is so lacking in the values 
embodied by the First Amendment that the “Constitution affords no protection to 
that expression.”179  Second, the Court has considered the interests competing with 
any benefit that may be derived from the speech.180  Using this methodology, the 
Court has delineated certain categories of speech that play “no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.”181 
The value of self-governance recognizes the importance in allowing citizens to 
contribute to public debate.  Political speech ranks as perhaps the most valued 
speech protected under the First Amendment.182  Although workplace speech can, 
in some instances, further self-governance, hostile environment theory suppresses 
little, if any, of the type of speech that furthers self-governance.  As described 
above, the Court seems to have already taken its position on the role of self-
governance in the workplace.  Only speech on matters of public concern that does 
not unduly disrupt business operations receives First Amendment protection.183  
Because most harassment is personal in nature and not intended to contribute to 
public debate, prohibiting harassment at work does not unduly hinder the value of 
self-governance.  Moreover, harassment that touches on matters of public concern 
is only prohibited under Title VII if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
victim’s conditions of employment and create an abusive environment.  It is in this 
circumstance, and only this circumstance, that Title VII places the interest in order 
and morality above any benefit that may be derived from the speech.  Accordingly, 
the hindrance to self-governance caused by regulating workplace harassment is 
relatively small.  
The second value, individual autonomy, recognizes that expression can be self-
defining.  Speech can be valuable for the simple reason that it allows speakers to 
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express themselves.184  With regard to hostile environment theory, individuals 
remain free to engage in harassment outside the workplace.  Also, practically 
speaking, there seem to exist far superior means with which to express one’s self 
than to harass someone else.  Therefore, the hindrance to individual autonomy 
caused by regulating workplace harassment would also seem relatively small.   
The third value, to promote truth though the marketplace of ideas, reflects the 
understanding that the truth is most likely to emerge from the clash of ideas.185  
Although Title VII’s hostile environment theory hinders the free flow of ideas, it 
does so only in the workplace.  While people spend a great deal of their lives at 
work, and the workplace is part of the marketplace in which ideas flow, the 
workplace implicates competing interests absent in public discourse that should be 
balanced against the truth-promoting benefit that might be derived from 
harassment.  Namely, hostile environment theory serves the important function of 
ensuring employees a workplace free from hostility and abuse.   
The fourth value, tolerance, signifies a concern for helping shape the 
intellectual character of society.186  There is a value in having all viewpoints 
expressed, however undesirable, because exposure to unpopular views promotes 
tolerance.187  Although Title VII’s hostile environment theory silences unpopular 
views, the same harassing speech that Title VII forbids in the workplace remains 
protected in public discourse.  As far as tolerating unpopular views, Title VII 
strikes a reasonable balance.  Unpopular views are silenced only at an absolute 
breaking point—when the harassment is so severe or pervasive that continued 
presence in the workplace is literally intolerable.   
As this analysis suggests, perhaps workplace harassment is so lacking in the 
values underlying the First Amendment that the Constitution should afford no 
protection to that expression.  It seems that little benefit is served by allowing 
harassing speech to flow freely in the workplace.  Further, the competing interest to 
ensure employees an environment free from hostility and abuse is undoubtedly 
important, even compelling.  Thus, although perhaps unlikely given the resistance 
to further dilute the First Amendment, the Court’s methodology could support a 
new categorical exception for workplace harassment.  
B.  Can the Government Regulate Workplace Harassment  
Based on Subject Matter?  
Assuming that workplace harassment is proscribable under any one of the 
theories described above, still remaining is the effect, if any, of the rule against 
subject-matter underinclusion.188  This Part discusses the key case regarding 
subject-matter underinclusion, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.  It then argues that Title 
VII’s hostile environment theory violates the rule against subject-matter 
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underinclusion by regulating harassing speech at work based solely on the subjects 
the speech addresses.  Hostile environment theory also fails to fit either exception 
to the rule against subject-matter underinclusion and likely fails strict scrutiny.  
Accordingly, this Part concludes that hostile environment theory is constitutionally 
invalid.  
1.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and the Rule Against Subject-Matter Underinclusion 
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,189 St. Paul charged the petitioner for setting fire to 
a cross on a black family’s property in violation of the following city ordinance:   
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, 
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi 
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender 
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.190 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether, as petitioner argued, the 
claim should be dismissed on First Amendment grounds because the ordinance 
constituted an invalid content-based regulation.191  
As the Court explained, the government generally may not proscribe speech or 
expressive conduct based on the ideas conveyed, but there are exceptions to the 
rule.192  Although the Court acknowledged that it often speaks of certain categories 
of speech as beyond the purview of the First Amendment, it clarified that what it 
really means is that the government may, consistent with the First Amendment, 
proscribe these categories of speech.193  But these categories of speech are not 
invisible to the First Amendment, and regulations of proscribable speech may not 
be made vehicles of further limitations on content or viewpoint.194  For example, 
although “the government may proscribe libel [because of its scant social value, the 
government] may not make the further content [and viewpoint distinction] by 
proscribing only libel critical of the government.”195  To hold otherwise, the Court 
reasoned, would defy common sense and upset its commitment to the First 
Amendment.196  Generally, the government may regulate within a category of 
proscribable speech only if the regulation survives strict scrutiny.197   
Notwithstanding the general rule against subject-matter underinclusion, the 
Court indicated that the government may regulate within a category of proscribable 
speech in two circumstances.  The first circumstance is “[w]hen the basis for the 
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech 
at issue is proscribable”—in other words, the regulation targets a particularly 
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offensive mode of expression.198  For example, the government “might choose to 
prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its 
prurience.”199 The second circumstance is where the regulation is concerned with 
the secondary effects of a particular subclass of speech rather than its content.200  
For example, the government may choose to “permit all obscene live performances 
except those involving minors,”201 the interest being to protect the well-being of 
minors, not to suppress ideas.  Also under the secondary effects exception, a 
“subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within 
the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech.”202  According to the 
Court, these two circumstances “refute the proposition that the selectivity of the 
restriction is ‘even arguably conditioned upon the sovereign’s agreement with what 
a speaker may intend to say’”203 and present “no realistic possibility that official 
suppression of ideas is afoot.”204   
In addressing the fighting words ordinance at hand, the Court assumed without 
deciding that the ordinance regulated only fighting words as defined in Chaplinsky, 
eliminating the need to address the issue of overbreadth.205  Nonetheless, the 
ordinance made unlawful only those fighting words based on “race, color, creed, 
religion, or gender.”206  By not proscribing fighting words based on other topics, 
such as political affiliation, union membership, or sexual orientation, the ordinance 
discriminated within a proscribable category of speech based on content.207  It also 
discriminated based on viewpoint, allowing the opponents of silenced speakers to 
express themselves freely.208  Further, the ordinance did not fall within either 
exception to the rule against subject-matter underinclusion.209  First, the ordinance 
could not be said to regulate only the most virulent fighting words: 
[T]he reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from the protection of 
the First Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea, 
but that their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially 
unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.  St. 
Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression--it has not, for 
example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate 
ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner.  Rather, it has 
proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that communicate messages of 
racial, gender, or religious intolerance.  Selectivity of this sort creates the 
possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas.210  
The Court also rejected the argument that St. Paul’s ordinance targeted 
                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 388. 
 199. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 200. Id. at 389. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 390 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 381. 
 206. Id. at 391. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 391-92. 
 209. Id. at 393. 
 210. Id. at 393-94 (emphasis omitted). 
2012] SPEAKING OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 201 
secondary effects within the meaning of Renton.211  Rather, the ordinance targeted 
listeners’ reactions to words, or the emotive impact of those words on the audience, 
which is a primary effect of speech.212  Finally, the ordinance failed to survive strict 
scrutiny.213  Although the city had a compelling interest in protecting the basic 
human rights of historically discriminated groups, the ordinance was not 
reasonably necessary because a less selective ordinance would have provided a 
suitable means to this end.214  Accordingly, the Court found the ordinance “facially 
unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis 
of the subjects the speech addresses.”215   
Cases predating R.A.V. use the same line of reasoning in the context of labor 
picketing.  In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,216 the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing near a school except 
peaceful picketing concerning a labor dispute of which the targeted school was 
involved.217  The ordinance was challenged by Earl Mosley, a federal postal 
employee who sought to peacefully picket a high school with signs charging the 
school with race discrimination.218  The question posed was whether Chicago 
could, consistent with the First Amendment, selectively exclude labor picketing 
from a general ban on picketing near a school.219  The Court struck down the 
ordinance as unconstitutional because it defined lawful picketing in terms of 
subject matter.220  The ordinance permitted peaceful picketing concerning a 
school’s labor dispute to the exclusion of peaceful picketing on all other subjects.221  
The First Amendment does not tolerate this type of selective underinclusion: 
[The] government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds 
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more 
controversial views.  And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or 
debating in public facilities.  There is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’ 
and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.  
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government 
may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they 
intend to say.  Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on 
content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.222 
As the Court explained, selective regulation of expression such as picketing is 
constitutional only to the extent that the selectivity (i.e., the discrimination among 
types of picketing) is “tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest.”223  
Although the Court recognized the substantial governmental interest in preventing 
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school disruption, the ordinance imposed a selective restriction on expressive 
conduct far greater than necessary to further that interest.224   
The Court struck down a similar ordinance in Carey v. Brown,225 also 
predating R.A.V.  Carey involved members of a civil rights organization arrested 
for engaging in a peaceful demonstration on the sidewalk outside the home of the 
city mayor, “protesting his alleged failure to support the busing of school children 
to achieve racial integration.”226  The protesters were convicted under a statute 
barring picketing except the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved 
in a labor dispute.227  Viewing the statute as indistinguishable from the ordinance in 
Mosley, the Court held that the statute’s selective exclusion of labor picketing from 
its general ban on picketing “accord[ed] preferential treatment to the expression of 
views on one particular subject.”228  Although the Court recognized the state’s 
substantial interest in protecting the privacy of the home, the statute was not 
sufficiently tailored to advance that objective because it differentiated based on the 
subject matter of the picketing, when one’s privacy is invaded regardless of the 
message that picketers are conveying.229  In other words, the captive audience 
doctrine is no defense to subject-matter underinclusion.230 
After R.A.V., the Court reaffirmed its framework for assessing statutes that 
regulate within a category of proscribable speech in Virginia v. Black.231  There, the 
Court considered Virginia’s statute banning cross burning carried out with “‘an 
intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.’”232  As an initial matter, the 
Court clarified the communicative nature of cross burning:  “when a cross burning 
is used to intimidate, few if any messages are more powerful.”233  It also 
recognized “true threats” as a category of proscribable speech, defined as words 
that “communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”234  The parties did not 
dispute that cross burning is a form of true threat.235  The question was whether 
banning only cross burning, and not all true threats, violated the holding in 
R.A.V.236 
Although underinclusive, the Court upheld the statute under the first exception 
for underinclusive regulations that consist entirely of the very reason the entire 
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class of speech at issue is proscribable.237  Unlike the fighting words ordinance in 
R.A.V., Virginia’s cross burning statute did not selectively regulate speech directed 
at certain disfavored topics:  “It does not matter whether an individual burns a cross 
with intent to intimidate because of the victim’s race, gender, or religion, or 
because of the victim’s ‘political affiliation, union membership, or 
homosexuality.’”238  Rather, Virginia merely chose to target “a particularly 
virulent” true threat: 
Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate 
this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning’s long and pernicious 
history as a signal of impending violence.  Thus, just as a State may regulate only 
that obscenity which is the most obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a 
State choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to 
inspire fear of bodily harm.239 
Black is an important case because it signifies the Court’s position that the rule 
against underinclusion is not limited to fighting words ordinances, but extends to 
other underinclusive regulations of speech.  Further, Black means that the rule 
against underinclusion applies with equal force to regulations of expressive 
conduct, since cross burning is a form of expressive conduct rather than pure 
speech.  Finally, the fact that the Court suggested that Virginia could not target true 
threats limited to specified classifications such as race, sex, and religion carries 
serious implications for Title VII’s hostile environment theory, which imposes just 
such limitation.   
2.  Hostile Environment Theory Impermissibly Restricts Speech  
Based on the Subjects the Speech Addresses 
In my view, Title VII’s hostile environment theory violates the rule against 
subject-matter underinclusion and cannot be saved under either exception 
articulated in R.A.V.  Like the fighting words ordinance in R.A.V. and the picketing 
ordinances in Mosley and Carey, hostile environment theory selectively suppresses 
certain disfavored subjects of harassing speech.  By limiting the reach of workplace 
harassment law, the government has accorded harsher treatment to the expression 
of views on the subjects of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.  The 
unmistakable message is that the government finds certain forms of harassing 
speech more offensive and disagreeable than others, violating a central tenet of 
First Amendment doctrine.240   
a.  Hostile Environment Theory Does Not Consist Entirely of the Reason Why 
Workplace Harassment as a Whole is Proscribable 
Under the first exception, content discrimination within a category of 
proscribable speech is justified “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination 
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is 
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proscribable”;241 in other words, when the regulation targets the most virulent 
manner of expression within a category of proscribable speech.   
Title VII’s hostile environment theory cannot be said to target only the most 
virulent harassment.  As I have argued, the very reasons that the entire category of 
workplace harassment should be deemed proscribable are because (1) the confines 
of the employment relationship compromise what might otherwise be a free choice 
to avoid workplace harassment; (2) workplace harassment contributes little to 
public debate and disrupts business operations by making continued presence in the 
workplace intolerable; and (3) the government’s interest to ensure employees an 
environment free from hostility and abuse outweighs any benefit that might be 
derived from workplace harassment.  The subject-matter limitation of hostile 
environment theory is not justified for these reasons.   
To illustrate, consider the law’s protection against sexual harassment to the 
exclusion of sexual orientation harassment.  First, a homosexual who is harassed 
for being homosexual is just as confined by the employment relationship and 
unable to avoid unwanted speech as a woman who is harassed for being female.  
Both employees face the same predicament—endure the harassment or forfeit their 
livelihood.  Second, heterosexist speech cannot be said to contribute more to public 
debate than sexist speech, and both forms of harassment disrupt business efficiency 
to the same extent.  Third, the government’s interest to have a workplace free from 
hostility and abuse is not furthered by censoring sexual harassment but not sexual 
orientation harassment—sexual harassment is not inherently more hostile and 
abusive than sexual orientation harassment.  Thus, there is no indication that the 
government has targeted “particularly virulent” forms of workplace harassment.242  
Instead, it appears that it has proscribed workplace harassment “of whatever 
manner” that communicates messages of racial, gender, religious, or ethnic 
intolerance, which suggests nothing more than a desire to suppress the expression 
of certain, disfavored ideas.243  
Further, to conclude that Title VII’s hostile environment theory targets only 
the most virulent workplace harassment would run counter to the Court’s decisions 
in R.A.V. and Black.  According to the Court, the practically identical subject-
matter limitation in R.A.V. did not target only the most virulent fighting words.  
And in Black, although the statute at issue did not contain a similar subject-matter 
limitation, if it had, the Court suggested that the statute would be unconstitutional.  
The subject-matter limitation in Title VII’s hostile environment is virtually 
indistinguishable from the subject-matter limitations in R.A.V. and the hypothetical 
in Black.   
Finally, as a practical matter, it is difficult to think of a basis for the Court to 
declare sexist speech to be a more offensive mode of expression than heterosexist 
speech.  Although equal protection analysis involves a hierarchical approach, 
placing certain classifications and rights ahead of others by declaring certain 
classifications “suspect” and certain rights “fundamental,” this hierarchical 
approach of subjects is patently out of place in a First Amendment analysis, where 
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all subjects of speech, however disagreeable, contribute to the free market place of 
ideas.  
b.  The Suppression of Expression Under Hostile  
Environment Theory is Not Incidental 
Under the second exception, regulating within a category of proscribable 
speech is justified where the limitation targets the secondary effects of a particular 
subclass of speech rather than its content.244  The Court indicated that a 
“subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within 
the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech.”245  Of particular 
importance, the Court suggested that Title VII does not impinge on First 
Amendment freedoms:  “Thus, for example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ 
among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition 
against sexual discrimination in employment practices . . . .”246  In proving this 
example, the Court cited to the regulation pertaining to sexual harassment, which is 
defined to include the maintenance of a sexually hostile environment.247  In the 
Court’s view, the suppression of select subclasses of proscribable speech under 
hostile environment theory is merely an incidental consequence of a statute 
directed at conduct.248 
Apart from this suggestion being dicta, this statement by the Court is flawed in 
several respects.  First, although part of a broader statute regulating conduct 
(discriminatory hiring and firing practices, as well as quid pro quo harassment), the 
suppression of speech under Title VII’s hostile environment theory is not 
incidental, but primarily the goal of the regulation.249  Contrast this with the speech 
merely incidentally suppressed in a discriminatory firing claim.  An employer who 
fires an employee because she is black may be sanctioned even though the 
employer accomplishes the discharge through words and even though certain 
statements made by the employer may ultimately prove the racial motivation 
behind the firing.250  The suppression of speech is incidental because the firing is 
discriminatory, and therefore unlawful, regardless of the manner in which it is 
accomplished or the emotive impact of the speech on the victim.  In a hostile 
environment claim, by contrast, an employer can be held liable only if the 
harassment is sufficiently hostile and only if the victim is subjected to an abusive 
work environment judged from the plaintiff’s perspective.251  
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Concurring in R.A.V., Justice White criticized the majority’s suggestion that 
hostile environment theory has only an incidental effect on speech.  According to 
Justice White, “application of this exception to a hostile work environment claim 
does not hold up under close examination.”252  As he explained: 
  First, the hostile work environment regulation is not keyed to the presence or 
absence of an economic quid pro quo, but to the impact of the speech on the 
victimized worker.  Consequently, the regulation would no more fall within a 
secondary effects exception than does the St. Paul ordinance.  Second, the 
majority’s focus on the statute’s general prohibition on discrimination glosses over 
the language of the specific regulation governing hostile working environment, 
which reaches beyond any “incidental” effect on speech.  If the relationship 
between the broader statute and specific regulation is sufficient to bring the Title 
VII regulation within O’Brien, then all St. Paul need do to bring its ordinance 
within this exception is to add some prefatory language concerning discrimination 
generally.253 
Justice White makes two valid points.  The hostile work environment 
regulation provides that “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, 
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
harassment when . . . [it] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with 
an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment.”254  The fact that the majority merely cited to the sexual 
harassment regulation but actually referred to Title VII’s “general” prohibition 
against sexual discrimination in employment practices suggests that it might have 
“glossed over” Title VII’s hostile environment theory and its more than incidental 
suppression of speech.  Title VII’s general prohibition against discriminatory acts 
does not make hostile environment theory’s suppression of speech any less direct.  
To find otherwise would create a loophole through which governmental bodies 
could selectively suppress certain, disfavored topics so long as they incorporate 
their direct regulations of speech into civil rights statutes that primarily target 
discriminatory conduct.  To characterize a speech restriction within a broad statute 
targeting conduct as “incidental” to the statute, and therefore free from First 
Amendment scrutiny, is both troublesome and lacking precedential support, as the 
Court has never exempted a generally applicable regulation from First Amendment 
scrutiny when it is clear that the regulation operates, at least in part, to restrict 
speech because of its content and emotive impact on the audience.255   
At least one court has questioned the Court’s dicta, opining that, at least in the 
case before it, Title VII regulates speech on the basis of its expressive content.256  
The Fifth Circuit stated that “Title VII steers into the territory of the First 
Amendment” and “when Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims founded 
solely on verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter, the statute imposes content-
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based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech.”257 
c.  Hostile Environment Theory Likely Fails Strict Scrutiny 
Because neither exception to the rule against subject-matter underinclusion 
saves hostile environment theory, to be upheld, the law must survive strict 
scrutiny—the subject-matter limitation must be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
governmental interest.258  There is little doubt that the interest in ensuring equal 
opportunity in employment is compelling.  The Court in R.A.V. agreed with St. 
Paul that the interest protected by its ordinance was compelling because “the 
ordinance helps to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups that have 
historically been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group 
members to live in peace where they wish.”259  Nonetheless, the ordinance was not 
narrowly tailored because a less restrictive ordinance would have served precisely 
the same benefit of ensuring basic human rights to historically disadvantaged 
groups but would have extended the benefit to all groups.260  Although hostile 
environment theory aims to promote equal opportunity in employment to 
historically disadvantaged groups, this aim can be achieved through less restrictive 
means.  The government could promote workplace equality without targeting only 
certain subjects of hostile expression.  Accordingly, hostile environment theory 
could be held invalid under the First Amendment.   
The protection against sexual harassment to the exclusion of sexual orientation 
harassment is particularly suggestive of the government’s desire to suppress 
offensive and disagreeable ideas.  This is because the speech used to harass victims 
based on sexual orientation can be strikingly similar to the speech used to harass 
victims based on sex.  Even having offered similar evidentiary support (e.g., 
degrading sexual commentary, pornographic materials, and sexual jokes), only 
plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment stand a chance at establishing a claim.261  The 
message is that the government disapproves of sexist speech but is willing to 
tolerate—and impliedly approves of—heterosexist speech.  
This narrow example is merely illustrative of the broader problem.  Hostile 
environment theory creates a hierarchy of expression.  It does this by shielding 
employees from racially, sexually, religiously, and ethnically harassing speech 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment (disfavored topics 
and viewpoints), while allowing or tolerating all other types of harassing speech 
meeting the same criteria, despite that the First Amendment regards all expression 
in the marketplace of ideas as equally valuable.262  In short, one cannot reasonably 
conclude that hostile environment theory presents “no realistic possibility that 
official suppression of ideas is afoot”263 because whether a victim of harassment 
can state a claim is entirely conditioned upon the sovereign’s agreement or 
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disagreement with the harasser’s message.  
IV.  THE VIABILITY OF A STATUS-BLIND STATUTE  
Having concluded that our current legal framework for regulating workplace 
harassment is unconstitutional, but recognizing the importance of preventing this 
type of verbal abuse, this Part proposes the enactment of a statute regulating 
“workplace bullying,” the status-blind equivalent of workplace harassment.  A 
status-blind statute would mark a significant departure in the law, but the idea has 
gained attention and popularity in the United States even apart from any First 
Amendment concerns.  This Part discusses the workplace-bullying movement, both 
in the United States and abroad, and addresses anticipated criticisms to a proposal 
of this kind.   
A.  The Workplace Bullying Movement 
Professor Yamada is at the forefront of the movement in favor of a status-blind 
statute.  He drafted the Healthy Workplace Bill to address what he regards as “the 
most neglected form of serious worker mistreatment in American employment 
law.”264  The Healthy Workplace Bill would create a cause of action for victims of 
severe workplace bullying and provide incentives for employers to prevent and 
respond to such abuse.265  
The bill would make it unlawful “to subject an employee to an abusive work 
environment,” which “exists when the defendant, acting with malice, subjects an 
employee to abusive conduct so severe that it causes tangible harm to the 
employee.”266  The bill defines abusive conduct as that which “a reasonable person 
would find hostile, based on the severity, nature, and frequency of the defendant’s 
conduct.”267  Actionable abuse includes “repeated infliction of verbal abuse such as 
the use of derogatory remarks, insults, and epithets; verbal or physical conduct of a 
threatening, intimidating, or humiliating nature; the sabotage or undermining of an 
employee’s work performance; or attempts to exploit a[n] employee’s known 
psychological or physical vulnerability.”268  
Several state legislatures have considered the bill or some variation thereof.269  
Although a legislature is yet to adopt it, the bill has received positive attention.270  
The bill has also generated a buzz in the social media, with articles devoted to 
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workplace bullying appearing in prominent magazines and news periodicals.271  
There are signs that the public’s sentiments regarding the bill are transforming from 
skepticism to advocacy,272 leading attorneys in the field to anticipate eventual 
enactment.273   
As another indication of the trend, a small but increasing number of 
employment policies proscribe workplace bullying.274  Professor Yamada attributes 
this development to the fact that courts and legislatures have started to take 
workplace bullying more seriously, which has led attorneys and human resources 
specialists to advise employers to provide status-blind protection against workplace 
bullying in their employee handbooks.275  Nonetheless, providing the protection is 
strictly voluntary.   
Another recent breakthrough came in the form of a provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA).  In 2009, unions in Massachusetts affiliated with the 
Service Employees International Union and the National Association of 
Government Employees negotiated a three-year CBA that includes a provision 
protecting against workplace bullying.276  An excerpt of the provision provides:   
Behaviors that contribute to a hostile, humiliating or intimidating work 
environment, including abusive language or behavior, are unacceptable and will 
not be tolerated.  Employees who believe they are subject to such behavior should 
raise their concerns with an appropriate manager or supervisor as soon as possible, 
but no later than ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the incident(s).277 
This bargained-for provision, covering over 21,000 public employees,278 is an 
indication that the problem of workplace bullying has caught the attention of labor 
and management.  As Professor David Yamada explains, however, this particular 
CBA allows an employee only to grieve an allegation of workplace bullying.279  
Grievances may not proceed to arbitration, making the provision only minimally 
effective.280  Further, not all unions will be as successful at negotiating.  A statutory 
remedy remains necessary to provide employees with effective and reliable 
protection against workplace bullying.  
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B.  Influences from Abroad  
Globally, the United States is behind in providing status-blind protection 
against workplace bullying.281  Many European countries refer to the problem as 
“mobbing,” a term that originated in industrial psychology to describe the behavior 
of a group of animals collaborating against an unwelcomed newcomer.282  Mobbing 
was then used by a Swedish child psychologist to describe the exclusionary tactics 
of a group of children against a particular child.283  Heinz Leymann, a German 
psychologist living in Sweden, carried the term over into the adult workplace.284  
Leymann’s research is thought to be among the earliest works uncovering and 
conceptualizing the phenomenon of workplace mobbing in the 1980s.285  French 
psychotherapist Marie-France Hirigoyen was also highly influential in bringing 
what she referred to as “moral harassment” into the legal lexicon in Europe and 
elsewhere.286  According to Hirigoyen, sexual and other forms of discriminatory 
harassment—which are prohibited under Title VII—comprise merely one subset of 
moral harassment.287   
Among the countries that have responded to the problem of workplace 
bullying with specific legislation are France, Belgium, Quebec, South Australia, 
and Sweden.288  Although Germany lacks specific legislation, victims of workplace 
abuse have had the benefit of unique constitutional and labor law protections 
establishing a tradition of preserving individual dignity.289  Germany’s Constitution 
provides that “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable”290  and “[e]veryone shall have 
the right to free development of his personality.”291  In addition, German law 
imposes two duties on the employment relationship:  employers owe a duty of care 
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to their employees,292 and employees owe a corresponding duty of loyalty to their 
employers.293  Employers also have the duty to protect the right of employees to 
develop their personalities.294  German jurists were able to seize on these unique 
protections to make mobbing legally cognizable even without a statute or 
regulation prohibiting it by name.295 
For several reasons, workplace harassment has had a very different history in 
the United States.  Workplace harassment was first conceptualized, not by 
prominent psychologists studying the effects of workplace abuse, but by feminists 
and civil rights lawyers concerned with breaking down barriers impeding women 
and other minorities in their pursuit of equality.296  Originating in a country with a 
dark history of slavery and inequality, it is not surprising that hostile environment 
theory emerged out of a concern for combating discrimination.  America’s highly 
mobile employment market and norm of at-will employment also explain the focus 
on discrimination.297  
Although the focus on discrimination makes sense from a historical 
perspective, without specific legislation prohibiting workplace bullying, and 
without a national tradition of protecting individual dignity, many victims of 
workplace abuse may be left without legal recourse.298  This unremedied problem is 
a real one, with 37% of adult Americans reporting that they have experienced it 
themselves.299  The Healthy Workplace Bill or other status-blind legislation is 
necessary to address this troubling void in American employment law. 
C.  Anticipated Concerns 
With the problem of workplace bullying becoming clearer, and the advocacy 
for specific legislation growing stronger, several concerns have been raised about a 
status-blind statute.  Would a status-blind statute cause a flooding of frivolous 
claims?  Would a status-blind statute demand civility in the workplace?  Is it 
possible to protect individual dignity without losing sight of equality?  These 
concerns are addressed below.   
First, although there would likely be an initial surge in litigation, the volume of 
frivolous claims would subside as claimants and their attorneys are reminded of the 
                                                                                                     
 292. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2012, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl.] at 
617-19 (Ger.). 
 293. The duty of care is explicit in the civil code, but the duty of loyalty “has been developed by 
scholarly writing and by the Courts’ jurisdiction.”  Manfred Weiss, Employee Loyalty in Germany, 20 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 237, 237 (1999). 
 294. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Law on Representation of Workers and Works Councils], 
July 29, 2009, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl.] at 75 (Ger.). 
 295. Friedman & Whitman, supra note 281, at 254-57. 
 296. Global Perspectives on Workplace Harassment Law, supra note 289, at 151. 
 297. Friedman & Whitman, supra note 281, at 265-66. 
 298. Lippel, supra note 286, at 6.  Some employees have sought relief in tort under the guise of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), but such claims rarely succeed.  Global Perspectives 
on Workplace Harassment Law, supra note 289, at 181 (stating that “typical workplace bullying seldom 
results in liability for IIED”). 
 299. The Healthy Workplace Campaign, The Problem:  Why is it a Problem?, HEALTHY 
WORKPLACE BILL, http://www.healthyworkplacebill.org/problem.php#problem (last visited Oct. 4, 
2012) (offering this and other statistics). 
212 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
severity of abuse required to satisfy the legal standard.300  As under hostile 
environment theory, actionable harassment under a status-blind statute would have 
to be truly extreme.  A status-blind statute would not make it unlawful to engage in 
ordinary teasing, flirting, joking, or horseplay.  Much like hostile environment 
theory, the Healthy Workplace Bill would proscribe harassment “that a reasonable 
person would find hostile, based on the severity, nature, and frequency of the 
defendant’s conduct.”301  The reasonable person standard draws heavily from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Harris concerning hostile environment theory.302  The 
legal standard is not easily met.  A status-blind statute such as the Healthy 
Workplace Bill would not require workers to be respectful, kind, or caring to one 
another.  The concern that a status-blind statute would impose a workplace civility 
code reflects a misunderstanding about the difference between mere incivility and 
intolerable abuse. 
The Healthy Workplace Bill also includes safeguards specifically designed to 
discourage frivolous claims and signify the bill’s concern for only the most severe 
forms of bullying.303  First, the bill is made enforceable “solely by a private right of 
action.”304  This feature of the bill would discourage the filing of frivolous claims 
because plaintiffs’ attorneys would be reluctant to take on weak cases.305  Although 
limiting the bill’s enforcement mechanism to a private right of action would leave 
some victims of actionable workplace harassment without legal representation, it 
could go a long way in garnering legislative support.  The bill also requires a 
showing that the harassment was undertaken with “[m]alice,” which means “the 
desire to cause pain, injury, or distress to another.”306  Professor Yamada included 
this requirement, with some reluctance, to shield off marginal claims and to signify 
the bill’s concern for only serious workplace abuse.307  The downside is that some 
victims of harmful bullying would have difficulty proving malice,308 but the 
requirement does tend to make the bill more politically palatable.   
The remaining concern is whether a status-blind statute would somehow 
trivialize the problem of discrimination.309  American employment law is 
overwhelmingly concerned about women and minorities, not employees in 
general.310  The primary concern is breaking down barriers facing historically 
disadvantaged groups, never mind that those same barriers stand in the way of 
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other employees.311  Because protecting women and minorities matters most in 
American culture, abandoning the discrimination paradigm would likely be met 
with resistance.312 
However, recognizing discriminatory harassment as but one subset of 
workplace abuse does not make the goal of combating discrimination less 
significant.  Importantly, a status-blind statute would not foreclose status-based 
claims.  The claimant would simply no longer have to prove a discriminatory 
motive.  Defining the harm in terms of dignity is for a practical reason:  all 
discrimination is harmful to individual dignity, but not all dignitary harms result 
from discrimination.313  To make clear that lawmakers remain concerned about 
discriminatory harassment, a status-blind statute could define moral harassment as 
an offense against one’s dignity that includes discrimination.  The Healthy 
Workplace Bill as drafted does not explicitly mention discrimination, but 
discriminatory harassment could easily be added to the illustrations of actionable 
workplace abuse.  Thus, perhaps it is possible to further dignity and equality 
simultaneously.   
In fact, some scholars argue that focusing on discriminatory harassment may 
have consequences for equality.  Rosa Ehrenreich, for example, has argued that 
focusing excessively on the discriminatory context in which workplace harassment 
occurs has fostered the distorted view of sexual harassment as a special “women’s 
injury.”314  As she explains, sexual harassment is wrong, not because women are 
women, but because it is an affront to women’s dignity as human beings.315  In 
addition, Vicki Schultz has argued that the sexual focus of sexual harassment has 
obscured the broader structural inequalities that are at the heart of employment 
discrimination legislation.316  According to Schultz, focusing on the sexual nature 
of harassment does not align with the goal of equal opportunity in employment, and 
efforts to eliminate sexual expression “may even encourage organizations to act in 
ways that undermine genuine workplace equality.”317  Schultz has argued that the 
focus on sexuality has led courts and employers “to neglect equally serious, 
nonsexual forms of harassment and exclusion that work to preserve traditional 
gender roles at work.”318  While these scholars do not suggest abandoning the 
discrimination paradigm, their concerns suggest that conceptualizing workplace 
harassment in terms of dignity would not necessarily mean a loss for equality.  
Although change is never easy, careful drafting can address many of the 
concerns associated with a status-blind statute, and other concerns reflect a 
misunderstanding about what a status-blind statute would look like and how it 
would operate.  In the end, regulating workplace bullying serves the benefit of all.  
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Adding to this picture are the First Amendment concerns associated with 
underinclusive regulations of speech.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
As this Article has principally argued, a status-blind statute may be necessary 
to align workplace harassment law with the First Amendment.  Regulations that are 
underinclusive in subject matter present the very real possibility that the 
government is targeting speech because of its agreement or disagreement with the 
views expressed.  Under Title VII’s hostile environment theory, the government 
has selectively targeted workplace harassment expressing views of racial, gender, 
religious, and ethnic intolerance, while leaving all other forms of harassment 
without legal recourse, precisely as the Court in R.A.V. condemned.  The Healthy 
Workplace Bill or other status-blind legislation offers a viable option for regulating 
discriminatory and other workplace abuse consistent with the First Amendment.  
 
